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MONITORED DISCLOSURE: A WAY TO AVOID
LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY IN REDISTRICTING
LITIGATION
Mark Tyson
Abstract: The Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution protects members of
Congress from testifying about “legislative acts” or having “legislative acts” used against
them as evidence. U.S. Supreme Court decisions delineating the scope of what constitutes a
“legislative act” have an episodic feel and have failed to create a readily applicable test for
new factual scenarios. One such scenario occurs when members of Congress communicate
with state legislators regarding congressional redistricting. Courts must know how to handle
instances where members of Congress assert legislative privilege in the redistricting context,
and specifically when members of Congress assert the privilege in an effort to prevent
disclosure of documentary material. Instead of resorting to the traditional “legislative acts”
test, courts should permit disclosure of written materials subject to the rules of discovery.
Courts should be vigilant in reviewing discovery requests to ensure that plaintiffs are not
unduly burdening members of Congress, thereby unnecessarily distracting them from their
work.

INTRODUCTION
[Members of Congress] shall in all Cases, except Treason,
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest
during their Attendance at the Session of their respective
Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for
any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be
questioned in any other Place.1
Our speech or debate privilege was designed to preserve
legislative independence, not its supremacy.2
The Speech or Debate Clause creates a privilege for members of
Congress from revealing information about “legislative acts.”3 The
Clause has been both praised as essential to the independence of the
legislature, in that it shields legislators from executive and judicial

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
2. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972).
3. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615–18 (1972).
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harassment,4 and criticized as a screen behind which misbehaving
legislators may escape the usual legal consequences of their actions.5
The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Clause to create a
testimonial privilege that protects members of Congress from testifying
regarding “legislative acts.”6 However, the circuit courts have split on
the question of whether the Clause also contains a nondisclosure
privilege.7 The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to furnish an answer.
What the U.S. Supreme Court has done is to construe the scope of the
privilege.8 Before 1972, the privilege was applied broadly.9 But in 1972,
the Court narrowed the privilege’s scope significantly in the seminal
case of Gravel v. United States.10 In spite of Gravel’s narrowing effect,
subsequent cases applying Gravel’s test have an episodic feel. The U.S.
Supreme Court will likely not conduct a fact-specific inquiry11 and will
not examine a Congressperson’s motive.12 But beyond that, much of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s guidance has come in dicta and has not proved
very useful in new contexts and fresh factual scenarios.13
One new context is redistricting. Redistricting takes place every ten
years14 with the goal of “realign[ing] a legislative district’s boundaries to
reflect changes in population.”15 Congressional redistricting must adhere
to a strict “one person, one vote” requirement.16 But even within this

4. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179−81 (1966).
5. See Léon R. Yankwich, The Immunity of Congressional Speech: Its Origin, Meaning and
Scope, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 960, 970−72 (1951).
6. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616.
7. Compare United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007), with
United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1097 (2012). A
nondisclosure privilege means that the Executive or other litigant cannot review evidence that may
contain a legislative act unless a legislator consents to the search. A.J. Green, Note, United States v.
Renzi: Reigning in the Speech or Debate Clause to Fight Corruption in Congress Post-Rayburn,
2012 B.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 501 (2012).
8. See generally infra Part I.
9. See infra Part I.C.
10. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
11. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 339 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
12. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951).
13. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 121 n.10 (1979) (stating in dictum that the
Speech or Debate Clause would not protect attempts to influence executive agencies).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
15. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1379 (9th ed. 2009).
16. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964). “One person, one vote” describes the equal
district population requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Laughlin McDonald, The
Looming 2010 Census: A Proposed Judicially Manageable Standard and Other Reform Options for
Partisan Gerrymandering, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 243, 243 (2009).
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stricture, there is a risk that redistricting bodies will use impermissible
criteria—such as impermissible racial criteria—to redraw district lines.
After the 2010 redistricting cycle, a group of Texas Latino voters
initiated suit against the Texas congressional and legislative redistricting
plan alleging that the redistricting decision makers had impermissibly
used racial animosity as a redistricting criteria.17 In an effort to prove
these allegations, the plaintiffs sought to discover written
communications between members of the United States Congress and
members of the Texas State Legislature.18 The members of Congress
made a motion for nondisclosure, arguing that legislative privilege
barred the plaintiffs from discovering their correspondence.19 However,
a Texas district court denied the motion and allowed the plaintiffs to
discover the correspondence.20 This case raises important questions
regarding both the actual scope of the privilege generally and the
appropriate scope of the privilege in the redistricting context
specifically.
Although the modern articulation of the privilege as delineated by
Gravel does not bar discovery in Perez v. Texas,21 it is easy to foresee
members of Congress using different arguments based on Congress’s
broad grant of authority to regulate redistricting as a method of
protecting future correspondence from being discovered.22 This is
important because redistricting plaintiffs who allege racial
gerrymandering already face a difficult burden to show intent.23 If future
plaintiffs were cut off from discovering information like the written
correspondence in Perez v. Texas, members of Congress and
redistricting bodies generally would be insulated from scrutiny by
private litigants. The public profits immensely from “private attorney
17. See Plaintiff Texas Latino Redistricting Task Forces Response to Defendants Motion for
Protective Order at 5, Perez v. Texas, No. 11-CA-360-OLG-JES-XR (W.D. Tex. July 29, 2011)
[hereinafter Plaintiff’s Response].
18. Order at 7, Perez v. Texas, No. 11-CA-360-OLG-JES-XR (W.D. Tex. Aug. 11, 2011).
19. Motion of Congresspersons Lamar Smith, Joe Barton, Louis Gohmert, Ted Poe, Samuel
Johnson, Ralph Hall, Jeb Hensarling, John Culberson, Kevin Brady, Michael McCaul, Michael
Conaway, Kay Granger, William Thornberry, Ronald Paul, Bill Flores, Randy Neugebauer, Pete
Olson, Francisco Canseco, Kenny Marchant, Michael Burgess, Blake Farenthold, John Carter and
Pete Sessions to Prevent Disclosure of Written Communications Subject to Privilege Under the
Speech and Debate Clause, United States Constitution, Perez v. Texas, No. 11-CA-360-OLG-JESXR (W.D. Tex. Aug. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Motion to Prevent Disclosure].
20. Order, supra note 18.
21. Order, supra note 18.
22. See infra Part IV.
23. Nathaniel Persily, Color by Numbers: Race, Redistricting, and the 2000 Census, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 899, 921 (2001).
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generals,”24 and losing that private check in the redistricting context
would be a heavy blow not only to individual rights, especially for
minority voters, but also to transparency in government generally.
For those reasons and others this Comment will explain below, at
least in the redistricting context, the legislative privilege should not
include an absolute nondisclosure privilege. Part I of this Comment
describes the Speech or Debate clause generally. Part II outlines
Congress’s authority to govern redistricting and explains redistricting
requirements. Part III describes Perez v. Texas. Part IV details how the
Perez court’s reasoning could harm future redistricting plaintiffs. Part V
asserts that the Speech or Debate Clause should not contain an absolute
nondisclosure privilege. Finally, Part VI argues that the Perez v. Texas
court reached the right result but for the wrong reasons, and that courts
in the future should eschew the “legislative acts” test in redistricting
cases in favor of applying normal discovery rules to protect members of
Congress from harassment and distraction.
I.

THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE: HISTORY, PURPOSE,
AND SCOPE

The Speech or Debate Clause confers both immunity and privilege on
members of Congress for “legislative acts.”25 The purpose behind the
Clause is to protect the legislature from other branches of government.26
Thus, courts have applied the Clause to both civil and criminal actions.
During the first several hundred years of the Clause’s existence, the U.S.
Supreme Court construed it broadly.27 However, in the 1970s, the Court
narrowed what constitutes a “legislative act.”28 While the Court’s test
narrowed the scope of “legislative acts,” it did not resolve all
ambiguities, including a question over which the circuit courts have
split: specifically, whether the Clause contains a nondisclosure
24. See Carl Cheng, Important Rights and the Private Attorney General Doctrine, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 1929, 1931 (1985). “The private attorney general doctrine provides for the enforcement of
public rights through the use of private lawsuits.” Id. at 1929 n.1.
25. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312−13 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616
(1972).
26. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 617.
27. See Comment, Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative Immunity, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 125, 131
(1973).
28. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 624–26; see Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, Legislative
Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1118 (1973); Brewster, Gravel,
and Legislative Immunity, supra note 27, at 146; Matthew R. Walker, Constitutional Law—
Narrowing the Scope of the Speech or Debate Clause Immunity, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 377, 388−90
(1995).
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privilege.29 Additionally, nearly all of the states have adopted some
version of the Clause;30 however, many have interpreted the Clause even
more narrowly than the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation.31 This
section will survey the past and current state of Speech or Debate Clause
jurisprudence as a way to feature the areas in which future application is
in doubt.
A.

The Speech or Debate Clause Creates Both an Immunity and a
Privilege

Article I, Section 6 of the U.S. Constitution provides that “for any
Speech or Debate in either House, [Members of Congress] shall not be
questioned in any other Place.”32 According to well-settled and longstanding U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Clause immunizes members
of Congress and their aides from criminal or civil liability for all acts
“within ‘the legislative sphere,’ even though their conduct, if performed
in other than legislative contexts, would in itself be unconstitutional or
otherwise contrary to criminal or civil statutes.”33 The Clause also
contains a testimonial and evidentiary privilege that shields members of
Congress from testifying about legislative acts or having legislative acts
used against them as evidence.34 The Clause has been both praised as
essential to the independence of the legislature in that it shields
legislators from executive and judicial harassment,35 and criticized as a
screen behind which misbehaving legislators may escape the usual legal
consequences of their actions.36 In some cases, the Clause will conceal
29. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1032 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Rayburn House
Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir 2007) (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v.
Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
30. Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege in State Legislatures, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 221 (2004).
31. Id. at 236–37.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The Clause was based on a similar provision from England.
Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 502 (1975). However, the American Speech or
Debate Clause is more expansive than its progenitor. See id. (“English history does not totally
define the reach of the Clause.”); see also United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 508 (1972)
(arguing that the privilege “must be interpreted in light of the American experience, and in the
context of the American constitutional scheme of government rather than the English parliamentary
system”).
33. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 312−13 (1973) (quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. at 624−25
(citations omitted)).
34. United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 487 (1979) (evidentiary privilege); Gravel, 408 U.S.
at 616 (testimonial privilege).
35. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178−81 (1966).
36. See Yankwich, supra note 5, at 970−72.
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and protect misconduct,37 yet it has been acknowledged that this
consequence is inevitable if the Clause is to serve its fundamental
purpose.38
B.

The Clause’s Purpose Is to Preserve Legislative Independence, and
Courts Have Applied It to Both Civil and Criminal Actions

Historically, the Clause’s fundamental purpose was to free the
legislature from executive and judicial oversight that threatens
legislative independence.39 The Court has been willing to go beyond the
actual text of the Clause in order to effectuate this purpose.40 But the
Court has made clear that the Clause was meant to preserve legislative
independence—not to establish legislative supremacy.41 Additionally,
the Clause is meant to protect the “functioning of Congress,” not the
reputation of its members.42 Courts applying the Clause are tasked with
doing so in a manner that will ensure Congress’s independence without
elevating it at the expense of the other two branches.43
The language of the Clause does not differentiate between civil
actions brought by individuals and criminal actions brought by the
executive branch.44 The U.S. Supreme Court has established that the
Clause immunizes members of Congress from civil actions seeking
redress for individual rights violations.45 These decisions indicate that
the Clause applies equally in cases initiated by the executive and in cases
brought by private citizens.46 A private civil action “creates a distraction
37. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 521.
38. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1170. Professor Reinstein and Silverglate
acknowledge that wrongdoing may go unpunished because courts will refuse to find jurisdiction
over the offense and the legislature will fail to discipline its misbehaving member. Id.
39. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 618.
40. See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 516 (“Admittedly, the Speech or Debate Clause must be read
broadly to effectuate its purpose of protecting the independence of the Legislative Branch, but no
more than the statutes we apply, was its purpose to make Members of Congress super-citizens,
immune from criminal responsibility.”); John C. Raffetto, Balancing the Legislative Shield: The
Scope of the Speech or Debate Clause, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 883, 889−90 (2010).
41. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 508.
42. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 419 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
43. See Brewster, 408 U.S. at 508.
44. Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1171.
45. See Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 84−85 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S.
367, 376 (1951); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 201−05 (1881).
46. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1172. However, Professor Reinstein and
Silverglate argue that the privilege’s scope should not be coterminous in cases initiated by the
executive and in cases brought by private citizens. They argue for what they dub a “functional
approach” which “views the privilege as evolving dynamically in response to changing
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and forces members to divert their time, energy, and attention from
legislative tasks to defend the litigation.”47 Private civil actions can also
be used to “delay and disrupt” the legislative process.48 And in the
modern era, civil actions brought by private parties may be an even more
significant threat to legislative independence than criminal investigations
and charges initiated by the executive branch.49
Without the Clause protecting members of Congress, litigants could
disrupt the legislative process by using civil discovery.50 Civil discovery
threatens to have a chilling effect on the business of legislators,
including whether they choose to exchange views on legislative activity.
According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit:
[E]xchanges between a Member of Congress and the Member’s
staff or among Members of Congress on legislative matters may
legitimately involve frank or embarrassing statements; the
possibility of compelled disclosure may therefore chill the
exchange of views with respect to legislative activity. This chill
runs counter to the Clause’s purpose of protecting against
disruption of the legislative process.51
Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has explained that even though a
private civil action does not implicate the executive branch in separation
governmental functions in order to fulfill the historic purpose of the privilege—the preservation of
legislative independence in a system of separation of powers.” Id. at 1121. This approach would
limit the privilege’s scope in cases brought by private citizens where separation of powers was not
at issue. Id. at 1122. But see Huefner, supra note 30, at 273 n.206. Professor Huefner disagrees with
Professor Reinstein and Silverglate, stating that “not only is there no textual basis” for
distinguishing between civil and criminal actions, historically, “the privilege also is much more
amenable to application to private charges than Reinstein and Silverglate suggest.” Id.
47. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975).
48. Id.
49. Huefner, supra note 30, at 274. Professor Huefner examines the article written by Reinstein
and Silverglate and concludes that “[t]heir resulting willingness to abandon the protections of the
legislative privilege in civil actions in part may have reflected an earlier era, in which rampant
private lawsuits against politicians for their legislative activities may not have been as certain as
they would be today, absent the legislative privilege. Whether or not such lawsuits are or were
commonplace, however, the more important reason for applying a legislative privilege to all types
of questioning is that American legislatures necessarily and routinely do make judgments that
inevitably affect individual private citizens, many of whom will be just as unhappy with those
judgments as they might have been with an adverse judicial resolution of some particular
controversy. Moreover, because legislative judgments typically affect not just one party but
thousands of citizens, the prospects that some unsatisfied individual will then attempt to seek relief
personally from the decisionmaker in fact are dramatically enhanced.” Id. at 274, n.208.
50. MINPECO, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 844 F.2d 856, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“A
litigant does not have to name members or their staffs as parties to a suit in order to distract them
from their legislative work. Discovery procedures can prove just as intrusive.”).
51. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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of powers concerns, legislative independence is still threatened by the
judiciary.52 “[W]hether a criminal action is instituted by the Executive
Branch, or a civil action is brought by private parties, judicial power is
still brought to bear on Members of Congress and legislative
independence is imperiled.”53 It follows that regardless of whether the
government or a private citizen initiates suit, legislative privilege applies
to legislative acts.54
C.

The U.S. Supreme Court Initially Construed the Privilege Broadly,
but Narrowed Its Scope Significantly in the 1970s

Early interpretations of the Speech or Debate Clause construed it
broadly.55 Kilbourn v. Thompson56 defined what became the traditional
scope of the legislative privilege:57 “[T]hings generally done in a session
of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before
it.”58 With this definition, the Court effectively hewed actions by
legislators in two, creating distinct categories for Speech or Debate
Clause purposes: (1) legislative, and (2) non-legislative action.59
Building on this distinction, the Court has cautioned that not all
conduct related to the legislative process is protected by the Speech or
Debate Clause.60 Thus, the mere fact that “Senators generally perform
52. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503; United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1038 (9th Cir. 2011) (“If
the Clause applies, it applies absolutely—there is no balancing of any interests nor any lessening of
the protection afforded depending on the branch that perpetrates the intrusion.”); cf. Rayburn, 497
F.3d at 658, 661, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (concluding that the privilege prohibited any executive
exposure to records of legislative acts, but that the judiciary could review evidence claimed to be
privileged).
53. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 503.
54. Id.
55. Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative Immunity, supra note 27, at 131 (“Coffin and Kilbourn
established the broad principle that ‘speech or debate’ was to be given a somewhat expansive
reading; actions within the scope of the legislative role were to be deemed within the ambit of the
privilege.”).
56. 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
57. Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative Immunity, supra note 27, at 131.
58. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 204.
59. See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 315 (1973) (noting that while the Speech or Debate
Clause protects members of Congress when they vote, it would not protect members carrying out
nonlegislative acts like the Sergeant at Arms in Kilbourn when, at the direction of the House, he
made an arrest that the courts found was made without authority).
60. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S 501, 515 (1972). The Court also noted that “the Speech or
Debate Clause does not prohibit inquiry into illegal conduct simply because it has some nexus to
legislative functions.” Id. at 528. “The only reasonable reading of the Clause, consistent with its
history and purpose, is that it does not prohibit inquiry into activities that are casually or incidentally
related to legislative affairs but not a part of the legislative process itself.” Id.
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certain acts in their official capacity” does not make those acts
“legislative in nature.”61 In Gravel v. United States, the Court set forth
the modern definition of what constitutes a legislative act:
The heart of the Clause is speech or debate in either House.
Insofar as the Clause is construed to reach other matters, they
must be an integral part of the deliberative and communicative
processes by which Members participate in committee and
House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage
or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other
matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of
either House.62
This definition significantly narrowed the scope of activities protected
by the Clause.63 The Kilbourn definition used general language to
delineate the Clause’s scope—“things generally done in a session of the
House by one of its members in relation to the business before it”64—but
the Gravel Court was careful to use more specific, detailed language in
setting the Clause’s outer limits.65 The Gravel definition is now the
authoritative standard for determining whether legislative action is
privileged.66
The Ninth Circuit, drawing on the language from Gravel, fashioned a
two-part test for determining whether legislative privilege should apply
to a given action.67 This characterization provides a useful analytical
framework for applying the Gravel test, but does not purport to add or
subtract anything from the substance of the test.68 The two prongs of the
test are as follows: “First, it must be ‘an integral part of the deliberative
and communicative processes by which Members participate in
Committee and House proceedings.’ . . . Second, the activity must
address proposed legislation or some other subject within Congress’
constitutional jurisdiction.”69

61. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
62. Id.
63. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1118; Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative
Immunity, supra note 27, at 146; Walker, supra note 28, at 377.
64. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880).
65. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625.
66. See generally Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
67. See Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1983).
68. Id.
69. Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625).
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Prior to United States v. Brewster70 and Gravel71—the two seminal
legislative privilege cases decided in 1972—there had been only five
U.S. Supreme Court decisions72 and few lower court decisions in which
speech or debate questions were raised.73 Despite the relative dearth of
case law, two patterns have emerged: first, the Court will not conduct a
fact-specific inquiry on what constitutes a legislative act;74 second,
circuit courts are currently split on whether there should be a
nondisclosure privilege.75
1.

The U.S. Supreme Court Will Not Conduct a Fact-Specific Inquiry
in Determining What Constitutes a Legislative Act

The somewhat formal distinction Gravel draws between legislative
and non-legislative acts is important to preserving the legislative
privilege.76 In drawing this distinction, the U.S. Supreme Court created a
legal regime that helps avoid problematic fact-based inquiries.77
Otherwise, each case would require a fact-specific inquiry, which would
risk eviscerating the privilege altogether.78 For example, if a court could
examine the motive behind legislative acts, then the Clause’s protection
would be illusory because a litigant could circumvent the Clause merely
by alleging an improper purpose;79 then, the privilege would not provide
the protection for which it was designed,80 and improper motives would

70. 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
71. 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
72. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82
(1967); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951);
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). Worth noting in Johnson—only the third time the
Court had addressed the privilege—the Court wrote: “In part because the tradition of legislative
privilege is so well-established in our polity, there is very little judicial illumination of this clause.”
Johnson, 383 U.S. at 179.
73. See Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative Immunity, supra note 27, at 129.
74. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-20 (3d ed. 2000).
75. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1032 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Rayburn
House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir 2007) (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
76. See TRIBE, supra note 74, at § 5-20.
77. Id.
78. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 339 (1973). “Put simply, we’d better make sure we don’t so
thoroughly question and probe each ‘speech or debate’ in assessing its privileged status that by the
time the member’s ordeal is over, being told that the privilege applies after all would be
anticlimactic.” TRIBE, supra note 74, at 1017.
79. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 508−09 (1975).
80. Id.
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be ascribed to legislative acts in “times of political passion.”81 For these
reasons, the Court will not probe into an alleged improper purpose in
determining whether an act is “legislative.”82 Furthermore, the Court will
not balance the interests behind the privilege against the rights asserted
by the opposing party.83 Where the privilege applies, it is absolute.84
In recent years, the Court has provided some guidance as to what type
of legislative action lies within the ambit of the Speech or Debate
Clause.85 The Court has stated in dictum that members of Congress who
intervene before executive agencies would not be protected by
legislative privilege.86 Although not binding, the Court would likely
follow this dictum because any intervention or attempt to influence an
executive agency would contravene an original basis for the privilege:
namely, separation of powers.87 Recognizing that the scope of the
privilege is hazy, courts have often resorted to defining the privilege by
what it does not cover rather than by what it does.88
For example, taking a bribe is never considered a legislative act.89
Other things not considered legislative acts include: “speeches delivered
outside of the legislature; political activities of legislators; undertakings
for constituents; assistance in securing government contracts;
republication of defamatory material in press releases and newsletters;
solicitation and acceptance of bribes; and criminal activities, even those
committed to further legislative activity.”90 While there seems to be
consensus regarding the above activities, the circuit courts have split on

81. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (cautioning that courts should not be in the
business of determining motive).
82. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966).
83. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 501, 509 n.16.
84. Id.
85. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172; see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 121 n.10
(1979).
86. See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172; see also Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 121 n.10 (citing dictum in
Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172); Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1163.
87. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1164.
88. United States v. Jefferson, 546 F.3d 300, 310 (4th Cir. 2008) (taking a bribe is never a
legislative act); Irons v. R.I. Ethics Comm’n, 973 A.2d 1124, 1131 (R.I. 2009) (“Activities that
remain unprotected by this immunity include, but are not limited to: speeches delivered outside of
the legislature; political activities of legislators; undertakings for constituents; assistance in securing
government contracts; republication of defamatory material in press releases and newsletters;
solicitation and acceptance of bribes; and criminal activities, even those committed to further
legislative activity.”).
89. Jefferson, 546 F.3d at 310.
90. Irons, 973 A.2d at 1131.
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the question of how the Clause is applied,91 specifically, the question of
whether the Clause contains a nondisclosure privilege.92
2.

Two Circuit Courts Have Split over Whether the Clause Contains a
Nondisclosure Privilege and the U.S. Supreme Court Has Yet to
Resolve the Split

The U.S. Supreme Court has never spoken directly on the issue of
whether the Clause includes a nondisclosure privilege.93 It is well
established that the Speech or Debate Clause includes a use privilege.94
In the context of the Speech or Debate Clause, a use privilege means that
the executive or other litigant cannot use any evidence that came from a
protected legislative act against a legislator in court.95 It is also well
established that the Clause includes a testimonial privilege.96 Although
the U.S. Supreme Court has not spoken directly on whether the Clause
includes a nondisclosure privilege, two circuit courts have.97
The D.C. Circuit held that in both the civil and the criminal context,
the Clause does include a nondisclosure privilege for documentary
evidence that comes from or involves “legislative acts.”98 In Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams,99 the D.C. Circuit held that the
Clause includes a nondisclosure privilege.100 The court stated that
nondisclosure is part of the privilege because “[d]ocumentary evidence
can certainly be as revealing as oral communications—even if only
indirectly when . . . the documents . . . do not detail specific

91. Compare United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir 2007), with
United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011).
92. Compare Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660, with Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1032.
93. A nondisclosure privilege means that the executive or other litigant cannot force disclosure of
evidence that may contain a legislative act unless a legislator consents to the search. Green, supra
note 7, at 501.
94. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975).
95. See Green, supra note 7, at 501; see also United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 487
(1979).
96. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972); see Wells Harrell, Note, The Speech or
Debate Clause Should Not Confer Evidentiary or Non-Disclosure Privileges, 98 VA. L. REV. 385,
417 (2012).
97. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1032; Rayburn 497 F.3d at 660 (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
98. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660; Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 415.
99. 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
100. See id. at 420−21; see also Huefner, supra note 30, at 225 (“It is now well settled that
the . . . Speech or Debate Clause protects both legislators and their staff from . . . document
production . . . .”).
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congressional actions.”101 The court emphasized that the purpose of the
Clause was to prevent interference with legislative activity.102 Thus, the
court concluded that plaintiffs could reach documentary material through
direct suit or subpoena only if “the circumstances by which they come”
are not considered within “‘legislative acts’ or the legitimate legislative
sphere.”103 In United States v. Rayburn House Office Building,104 the
D.C. Circuit reiterated that the Clause’s testimonial privilege extends to
nondisclosure of written legislative materials.105 The Rayburn decision
was not well received by legal academia.106 Scholarship criticizing the
Rayburn decision was published quickly;107 however, none of the other
circuits addressed the decision until 2011.108
In 2011, the Ninth Circuit expressly disagreed with the D.C. Circuit,
holding that the Clause did not contain an absolute nondisclosure
privilege, even for documentary evidence that comes from or involves
“legislative acts.”109 In United States v. Renzi,110 the Ninth Circuit
refused to find that the Speech or Debate Clause contained a
nondisclosure privilege in both civil and criminal discovery.111 In
directly rejecting the D.C. Circuit’s position in Rayburn, the Ninth

101. Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 420.
102. Id. at 421.
103. Id.
104. 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir 2007).
105. See id. at 660. Rayburn involved a search warrant of a congressperson’s office, whereas
Brown & Williamson involved a subpoena to compel document disclosure. Brown & Williamson, 62
F.3d 408. Despite these differences, Rayburn affirmed Brown & Williamson based on the same
rationales. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660 (“[O]ur opinion in Brown & Williamson makes clear that a
key purpose of the privilege is to prevent intrusions in the legislative process and that the legislative
process is disrupted by the disclosure of legislative material, regardless of the use to which the
disclosed materials are put.”).
106. See Sarah Letzkus, Comment, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: The Speech or
Debate Clause and Investigating Corruption in Congress, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1377 (2008); Recent
Case, D.C. Circuit Holds that FBI Search of Congressional Office Violated Speech or Debate
Clause—United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007), 121
HARV. L. REV. 914 (2008); Brian Reimels, Note, United States v. Rayburn House Office Building,
Room 2113: A Midnight Raid on the Constitution or Business as Usual?, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 293
(2007); James Walton McPhillips, Note, “Saturday Night’s Alright for Fighting”: Congressman
William Jefferson, the Saturday Night Raid, and the Speech or Debate Clause, 42 GA. L. REV. 1085
(2008).
107. See sources cited supra note 106.
108. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1097
(2012).
109. Id. at 1032.
110. 651 F.3d 1012.
111. Id.
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Circuit made clear that preventing distraction to legislators was not the
absolute purpose of the Clause.112 Further, the court concluded that the
D.C. Circuit had prioritized protecting legislators from distraction
without considering the legitimate counter interests in preventing illegal
acts like corruption and bribery.113 The court stated that a correct
interpretation of U.S. Supreme Court precedent reveals that “concern for
distraction alone precludes inquiry only when the underlying action
itself is precluded . . . .”114 Thus, Renzi affirmed the district court’s
recognition that the privilege “is one of use, not non-disclosure.”115
Despite the circuit split created by the Renzi decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court refused to grant petition for certiorari.116 However, Renzi
quickly generated positive responses from scholars.117 These scholars
also criticized the Rayburn decision and the D.C. Circuit’s position that
the Clause contains a nondisclosure privilege.118
D.

While Most States Have a Version of the Federal Speech or Debate
Clause, Many Have Interpreted Their Versions More Narrowly
than the Federal Counterpart

Forty-three state constitutions have some version of the Speech or
Debate Clause,119 and the common law has also recognized a similar
privilege.120 Twenty-three of the forty-three states have a constitutional
provision that is essentially identical to the Federal Speech or Debate
Clause.121 But many of the states that have considered the Clause have
narrowly interpreted their own provisions, denying state legislators
“protections that members of Congress would receive under the federal
Speech or Debate Clause.”122 For example, two New York trial courts

112. Id. at 1034.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1035 (emphasis in original). The court cited the following U.S. Supreme Court cases to
illustrate this point: United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 480–81, 488 n.7 (1979); United States
v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 173–77 (1966) (describing the Government’s investigation into actual
legislation and other clear legislative acts); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 629 n.18 (1972).
Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1036−37.
115. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1018.
116. Id. at 1034, cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1097 (2012).
117. See Harrell, supra note 96, at 385; Green, supra note 7, at 493.
118. See sources cited supra note 117.
119. See sources cited supra note 117.
120. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373 (1951).
121. Huefner, supra note 30, at 236.
122. Id. at 225.
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held that their state version of the Speech or Debate Clause only
protected legislators from liability, but not from being forced to answer
questions about their work.123 Some states could justify this narrow
construction based on different language in the state provisions, but the
textual differences seem to be more indicative of stylistic preference
rather than of substantive alteration.124
Although some states have interpreted their own clauses narrowly,
other states have little or no jurisprudence addressing their version of the
Speech or Debate Clause.125 However, at least one scholar predicts that
state courts will soon be forced to interpret the state versions of the
Clause.126 Professor Huefner, who has published extensively on election
law, predicts that disclosure suits will become more common in states.127
He foresees these kinds of disclosure suits proliferating based on a
number of developments, including: state legislatures becoming more
professionalized combined with increasingly complex issues and more
authority being accorded to state legislatures from Congress; a more
litigious society that will seek to harass and burden legislatures based on
political motivations; and finally, the trend towards more open
government, exemplified by state copycat versions of the Freedom of
Information Act as well as other “sunshine” laws.128
Part II briefly describes the redistricting process, highlighting the role
of Congress in that process. The reason for this shift in focus is to
provide context for the substantive area in which courts will apply the
preceding Speech or Debate Clause jurisprudence.
II.

THE CONSTITUTION GRANTS CONGRESS AUTHORITY TO
REGULATE CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING

While U.S. Supreme Court decisions addressing the Speech or Debate
Clause have increased since the 1970s, the Court has never decided a
Speech or Debate Clause case in the redistricting context. Yet
123. Abrams v. Richmond Cnty. S.P.C., 479 N.Y.S. 2d 624, 628 (Sup. Ct. 1984); Lincoln Bldg.
Assocs. v. Barr, 147 N.Y.S. 2d 178, 182 (Mun. Ct. 1955).
124. Huefner, supra note 30, at 239.
125. Id. at 259.
126. Id. at 260.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 226−27. State “sunshine” laws “requir[e] governmental bodies to give the public
access to the decision-making process in the form of public meetings, so the citizenry can learn not
only what decisions are made, but also why and how decisions are made.” Charles N. Davis et al.,
Sunshine Laws and Judicial Discretion: A Proposal for Reform of State Sunshine Law Enforcement
Provisions, 28 URB. LAW. 41, 41 (1996).
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redistricting litigation occurs routinely,129 and district courts will surely
have to address Speech or Debate Clause issues in redistricting cases.130
It is already very difficult for private litigants to prove wrongdoing,
especially those alleging improper redistricting practices based on
racially motivated decisionmaking.131 Litigants alleging racially
motivated decisionmaking should know whether civil discovery in
redistricting cases is a worthwhile avenue to pursue.
Redistricting is intertwined with congressional activity.132 Members
of the House of Representatives are elected based on where voters reside
as determined by the redrawing of electoral lines, and Congress, acting
as a body, has significant power to affect how redistricting occurs.133
While the Constitution imposes some direct limitations on the final
redistricting product,134 it also gives Congress power to affect the
process and, ultimately, the outcome.135
A.

Several Constitutional Provisions Govern Redistricting

Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that
“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several
states . . . according to their respective numbers.”136 The U.S. Supreme
Court has interpreted this Section to govern population equality for
congressional redistricting.137 Congressional redistricting involves
drawing districts from which members of the United States House of
Representatives are elected.138 While Section 2 provides for equal
reapportionment, Article I, Section 4, Clause 1—known as the Elections
129. Note, Federal Court Involvement in Redistricting Litigation, 114 HARV. L. REV. 878, 879
(2001).
130. Id. See generally Order, supra note 18. As noted above, the Court has yet to resolve whether
the Clause includes a nondisclosure privilege. With the ubiquity of email correspondence, it is easy
to foresee similar factual scenarios as the one that arose in Perez v. Texas, making this analysis
particularly timely.
131. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
133. See sources cited supra note 132.
134. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
135. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (elections for federal office); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5;
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
137. J. GERALD HEBERT ET AL., THE REALIST’S GUIDE TO REDISTRICTING 4 (2d ed. 2010); see
also Karcher v. Dagget, 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
138. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: A PUBLIC INFORMATION
MONOGRAPH 1 (1981).
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Clause—gives Congress the ultimate authority to regulate federal
elections.139
The Elections Clause provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner
of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the
Places of chusing Senators.”140 This Clause allows states, in the absence
of congressional mandate, to regulate elections for federal office.141 If
Congress enacts statutes that conflict with state regulations, federal law
will prevail.142 Additionally, Congress may govern federal and state
elections based on Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment and Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.143
B.

Congressional Districts Must Be Reapportioned Equally and Are
Regulated by Constitutional and Statutory Law

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the population of congressional
districts in the same state must be as nearly equal in population as
practicable.144 “[T]here are no de minimis population variations, which
could practicably be avoided, but which nonetheless meet the standard
of Art. I, § 2, without justification.”145 In other words, the state must
prove that population variations could not have been reduced or
eliminated by a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population.146
As noted above, Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution requires
a congressional plan to comply with the “one person, one vote”
principle;147 in addition, the Fourteenth Amendment extends the “one
person one vote” requirement to legislative redistricting.148 The U.S.

139. See Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997).
140. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
141. See Foster, 522 U.S. at 69.
142. Id. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that “nothing in the language of that
article gives support to a construction that would immunize state congressional apportionment laws
which debase a citizen’s right to vote from the power of courts to protect the constitutional rights of
individuals from legislative destruction.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
143. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
144. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–8.
145. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 734 (1983).
146. See id. at 739.
147. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
148. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–8; Pamela S.
Karlan, The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731, 733–
34 (1998).
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Constitution also prohibits map drawers from purposefully
discriminating against racial minorities.149 In theory, it does not allow
redistricting maps to be the product of excessive political
gerrymandering.150 Finally, the U.S. Constitution prohibits map drawers
from “subordinat[ing] traditional race-neutral districting principles” to
race-based districting principles.151 Federal statutory law imposes further
restrictions. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA)152
prohibits a plan from resulting in the dilution of minority voting
strength.153 Section 5 of the VRA prohibits a plan from reducing
minority-voting strength relative to prior levels.154 Finally, a plan must
use single-member districts.155
The Equal Protection Clause has given states broader latitude in
legislative redistricting.156 A state must make a good-faith effort to
create districts that are as close to “equal population as is practicable.”157
But, because the Court has recognized that it is “a practical impossibility
to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an identical number
of residents, or citizens, or voters[,]” the Court allows states to deviate
from the equal population ideal.158 A legislative apportionment plan is
not facially invalid so long as the maximum population deviation falls
below ten percent.159 And even if the range is more than ten percent, a
state may be able to justify the inequality by proffering other legitimate
objectives.160 Allowing states to justify deviations from equal population
combats an “overemphasis on raw population figures” that could trample
149. See Karlan, supra note 148, at 733.
150. Id.; see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 124–25 (1986).
151. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995); Karlan, supra note 148, at 733.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). Congress enacted Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act “to help
effectuate the Fifteenth Amendment’s” suffrage protection. Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 152
(1993). Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits any state or political subdivision from
imposing any “voting qualification[s] or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure . . . in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement” of a United States citizen’s
right to vote on account of race, color or status as a member of a language minority group. 42
U.S.C. § 1973(a).
153. See Karlan, supra note 148, at 733−34.
154. See Karlan, supra note 148, at 734.
155. 2 U.S.C. § 2c (2006); see Karlan, supra note 148, at 734.
156. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973).
157. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964).
158. Id.
159. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983).
160. Mahan, 410 U.S. at 324–25. The justification for the overall range exceeding ten percent in
this case was a desire to respect the boundaries of political subdivision. Id. at 325. Another
justification is to provide for “compact districts of contiguous territory.” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578.
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other factors that are important to acceptable reapportionment
arrangement.161
In spite of these substantive constraints—and the Voting Rights Act
in particular—it is still very difficult for a plaintiff to prove that
congressional redistricting was based on impermissible factors, such as
racial animosity.162 As evidence of impermissible consideration, courts
will rely on, among other things, “statements made by legislators and
their staff.”163 But what if plaintiffs could no longer access these kinds of
statements? How would plaintiffs prove intent to use impermissible
factors such as racial animosity? These questions were implicated by a
recent Texas case, Perez v. Texas, where members of Congress refused
to disclose their written communications with Texas state legislators.164
The Perez court’s order provided an excellent opportunity to define the
contours of the Speech or Debate Clause in the redistricting context.
III. THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE OF THE LEGISLATIVE
PRIVILEGE IN THE REDISTRICTING CONTEXT WAS
RECENTLY IMPLICATED BY PEREZ V. TEXAS
Litigation has proliferated in recent redistricting cycles.165 Plaintiffs
initiate redistricting suits for all sorts of reasons, including as a political
maneuver to block plans that risk harming a political faction.166
However, not all suits are political ploys: minority voters often bring suit
when they feel that they have been discriminated against in the
redistricting process.167 One such suit occurred in 2011 when a group of
Hispanic voters from Texas initiated suit against Texas state legislators,
alleging impermissible use of racial criteria in the redistricting
process.168 During discovery, the plaintiffs requested that Texas state
legislators disclose certain written communications.169 The request
demonstrates the importance of defining the appropriate scope of the
legislative privilege in the redistricting context.
On August 5, 2011, members of the U.S. Congress submitted a
161. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 749 (1973).
162. HEBERT ET AL., supra note 137, at 63−64.
163. Id. at 65.
164. Order, supra note 18, at 3.
165. Federal Court Involvement in Redistricting Litigation, supra note 129, at 879.
166. Id. at 879–80.
167. See Plaintiff’s Response, supra note 17, at 5.
168. Id.
169. Order, supra note 18, at 3.
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motion to prevent disclosure of written communication between
themselves and certain Texas state legislators regarding the Texas state
legislature’s redistricting.170 The plaintiffs, who were suing the Texas
state legislators, had requested production of the written
communications.171 The members’ legal theory for nondisclosure was
that the communication was privileged under the Speech or Debate
Clause.172
In their motion, the members of the U.S. Congress stated that no court
has ever forced a “sitting Member of Congress, their staff, or their
counsel to submit to either deposition or production of documents in a
redistricting case . . . .”173 Although the plaintiffs had requested
production only from the Texas state legislators, the members of
Congress argued that the nondisclosure privilege was absolute and thus
barred production of privileged information no matter who was
producing the information.174 The members argued that the reason why a
court has never forced members of Congress to submit to discovery
requests in a redistricting case is because “[e]very Member of Congress
takes an interest in, and is affected by, redistricting, and as such it is an
important part of congressional business.”175
Next, the members of Congress cautioned the court that allowing the
correspondence to be discovered would create an easy avenue for
political opponents to use “compelled testimony of Members of
Congress or production of their privileged communication with their
constituent legislators” to work mischief.176 Specifically, the members of
Congress were concerned that potential plaintiffs would use discovery to
obtain political strategies.177 The members of Congress also feared that
allowing their communication to be discoverable would have a “chilling
effect” on Congress because its members would “not be able to have
frank and honest communications with their constituent legislators
regarding Congressional business.”178
To illustrate that such a “chilling effect” was a real threat, the
members of Congress noted that many of the same plaintiffs had sought
170. Id. at 3–4.
171. Id. at 5.
172. Id. at 3.
173. Motion to Prevent Disclosure, supra note 19, at 4.
174. Id. at 3 n.7.
175. Id. at 4.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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discovery from one of the same members in the previous redistricting
cycle.179 The members of Congress also pointed out that the Texas
District Court in that case had quickly quashed the plaintiffs’
subpoenas.180 The members of Congress also relied on a California case,
Cano v. Davis.181 According to the members of Congress, an amicus
brief filed in that case identified the problem with allowing
communications between members of Congress and their constituent
state legislators to be discovered:
Parties to redistricting litigation will inevitably attempt to pry
into politically sensitive discussions between Representatives
and state legislators, other Members of Congress, constituents,
party representatives and/or political consultants . . . . Worse,
given the inherently political nature of redistricting litigation,
plaintiffs unhappy with the outcome of the state legislative
process may also seek to question Representatives to harass,
embarrass or damage political opponents or other perceived
beneficiaries of the redistricting legislation, or to obtain
publicity for a political agenda . . . .182
The Perez court denied the motion for nondisclosure.183 Relying on
Gravel184 and Brewster,185 the court found that the communication
between the members of Congress and their constituent legislators fell
outside the ambit of the privilege.186 The court adopted the two-part test
that the Ninth Circuit had formulated based on the Gravel test for
determining which actions or activities qualify for the privilege.187
“First, it must be ‘an integral part of the deliberative and communicative
processes by which Members participate in Committee and House
proceedings. Second, the activity must address proposed legislation or
some other subject within Congress’ constitutional jurisdiction.’”188 To
pass the Gravel test, a member of Congress must meet both of these

179. Id. at 5. The Congressman is Joe Barton. Id.
180. Id.
181. 211 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 537 U.S. 1100 (2003).
182. Motion to Prevent Disclosure, supra note 19, at 5 (quoting Brief for Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoenas
Filed by U.S. Representatives Berman, Filner and Shennan, Cano, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1208).
183. Order, supra note 18, at 7.
184. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
185. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
186. Order, supra note 18, at 5−6.
187. See id. at 4–5 (citing Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1983)).
188. Id. at 4 (quoting Miller, 709 F.2d at 529).
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requirements.189
Here, the court determined that the members of Congress had failed
both steps.190 First, the court stated that “[b]ecause . . . their legislative
affairs are affected only incidentally,” and “because the communications
[fell] outside of [their] sphere of legislative duties” the communications
were not a part of the “‘deliberative and communicative process.’”191
Second, the court stated that the communication did not involve
“proposed legislation or some other subject within Congress’
constitutional jurisdiction.”192
Additionally, the court analogized the factual scenario in Perez to two
U.S. Supreme Court cases where the Court had noted that any attempt by
the legislature to influence executive agencies would not be protected by
legislative privilege.193 While the interaction in Perez was not factually
identical, the court said that the principle from those cases is that the
legislature cannot invoke the privilege when it discusses a matter outside
of its jurisdiction and seeks “to influence the decisions of a state
legislative body.”194
IV. THE PEREZ V. TEXAS CASE RAISES AN IMPORTANT
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION AND AFFECTS HOW
FUTURE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WILL ASSERT THE
PRIVILEGE IN REDISTRICTING CASES
While this order from Perez v. Texas may seem like a small issue in
what is a much larger redistricting case,195 the practical implications are
189. See Miller, 709 F.2d at 529.
190. Order, supra note 18, at 5−6.
191. Id. at 5 (quoting Miller, 709 F.2d at 529).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 5−6 (citing Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 121 n.10, 131 (1979); United States
v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966)). But see Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1163.
Professor Reinstein and Silverglate propose arguments for why legislators intervening before
executive agencies on behalf of their constituents may be a good thing. “It may be argued that there
is a congressional role akin to that of an ombudsman with respect to executive agencies. With the
tremendous growth of these federal agencies and the mushrooming number of bureaucrats, there is
much to be said for Members of Congress using their influence to protect constituents from
injustice. And the positive effects of such intervention on the workings of government go beyond
relief for individual constituents who feel helpless when confronted with a gigantic bureaucracy; the
intervening legislator is also in a position to help administrators keep in touch with popular opinion
concerning the activities of their agency. In addition, studies of Congress attest generally to the
fairly widespread nature of legislative intervention before executive agencies.” Id. at 1163–64
(footnotes omitted).
194. Order, supra note 18, at 6.
195. Broadly stated, the issue in the case was “[w]hether Texas’ redistricting plan violates the
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significant, and the order raises an important constitutional question:
what is the appropriate scope of the legislative privilege in the
redistricting context? The Perez court seemed sure that this
communication was outside the modern version of the test.196 But the
broad textual grant of Congress’s plenary authority over federal
redistricting matters in the Constitution,197 along with the practical
concerns highlighted by the members of Congress,198 indicates that this
question deserves a more thorough analysis.
Moreover, it is foreseeable that this issue will continue to arise in the
context of suits where large groups of minority plaintiffs sue, alleging
that redistricting committees have inappropriately re-drawn
congressional districts in such a way that dilutes a group’s ability to elect
a candidate of their choice. In fact, the Texas plaintiffs had sought
discovery from one of the members of Congress named in this litigation
in the previous redistricting cycle.199
It is also foreseeable that members of Congress will continue to
consult various individuals including state legislators who are in charge
of re-drawing the district lines, and so, it is important that members of
Congress understand whether those communications will be protected by
legislative privilege. Framed more directly, are these communications
“legislative acts” under the standard Gravel test? And, regardless of the
answer to the first question, normatively, should they be protected by
legislative privilege in light of the peculiarities of redistricting?200 Even
if the act of communicating with certain individuals regarding
redistricting is not considered a “legislative act,” questions linger. In
fact, the way that the Texas court resolved this problem, while
seemingly innocuous, could be potentially dangerous for future plaintiffs
alleging impermissible gerrymandering.201

Constitution because it does not make a good faith effort to maintain population equality and treats
inmates as residents of the counties in which they are incarcerated.” Ohio State Univ. Moritz
College
of
Law,
Perez
v.
Texas,
ELECTION
LAW
@
MORITZ,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/PerezVTexas.php (last updated Oct. 3, 2012).
196. See Order, supra note 18, at 3–6.
197. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
198. See Motion to Prevent Disclosure, supra note 19.
199. Id. at 5.
200. What distinguishes redistricting from most other contexts in which these cases have taken
place is Congress’s nearly plenary authority over redistricting matters. See supra Parts II & II.A.
201. See infra Part VI.
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Members of Congress Might Use Other Arguments to Reach the
Shelter of Legislative Privilege, Thereby Depriving Redistricting
Plaintiffs of Access to Important Evidence

The Texas court failed to foresee alternative ways that the members
of Congress could have argued the motion, and in doing so, the court
may have inadvertently encouraged members of Congress to exploit a
gap in the “legislative acts” test. The members of Congress could have
resorted to other arguments, especially in light of Congress’s broad
authority over redistricting matters, to put themselves in what is clearly a
protected category of the Speech or Debate Clause. To illustrate this, it is
helpful to think about how these discovery requests could take place in
future cases.
Plaintiffs would first make a discovery request, asking the members
of Congress to turn over correspondence. Then, the members of
Congress would have a choice to make. They could try to do what the
members of Congress in Perez v. Texas did by asserting that their
communications constitute “legislative acts” and hope that another court
is more sympathetic to their position. However, after Perez, a welladvised member of Congress might take a different tack.202
Instead, members of Congress might choose to link their activity to
something that the U.S. Supreme Court has unequivocally stated is
activity that falls within the legislative sphere. For instance, members of
Congress in the process of investigating potential legislation are squarely
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.203 Future members of
Congress could assert that they were investigating redistricting
legislation and invoke their broad authority under Article I, Section 4 of
the U.S. Constitution and the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments.204 That explanation should suffice to keep
the communications sheltered under existing precedent, at least in a
jurisdiction such as the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,

202. Of course, other courts might have decided this differently, and so it is conceivable that
members of Congress will continue to attempt this argument. However, because of the dearth of
precedent in this area, a future court would almost surely consult the Texas court’s order as a source
of guidance.
203. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504–05 (1975) (explaining that the
privilege will attach when Congress investigates in a procedurally regular manner).
204. “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law
make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4;
see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
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which recognizes the nondisclosure privilege.205
It is this possibility that makes the need to examine the scope of the
Clause all the more acute. To that end, this Comment will first address
the issue of whether the Clause should contain a nondisclosure privilege.
Second, it will address whether the actions of the members of Congress
in Perez v. Texas should fall within the modern articulation of the
privilege. Third and finally, this Comment will examine redistricting and
explore whether it warrants special treatment in light of Congress’s
authority over regulating redistricting matters from Article I, Section 4
of the U.S. Constitution.
V.

A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECH OR DEBATE
CLAUSE DEMONSTRATES THAT THE CLAUSE SHOULD
NOT CONTAIN AN ABSOLUTE NONDISCLOSURE
PRIVILEGE

As a threshold matter, it is important to first determine whether the
Speech or Debate Clause contains a nondisclosure privilege, not just a
testimonial privilege.206 It is important because if the Clause does not
contain a nondisclosure privilege, then there is no basis to say that the
Clause should shield all documentary evidence—containing or
stemming from “legislative acts”—from discovery. This would help
prevent members of Congress from exploiting the gap in the “legislative
acts” test in the redistricting context because, even if they linked their
activity to legitimate “legislative activity,” the documentary evidence
could still at least be disclosed, if not necessarily used. However, if the
Clause does contain an absolute nondisclosure privilege, at least in the
redistricting context, members of Congress may be able to prevent
almost all disclosure.207
A.

Neither Distraction Concerns Nor Separation of Powers Concerns
Support Incorporating an Absolute Nondisclosure Privilege into
the Speech or Debate Clause
The U.S. Supreme Court has never definitively stated that the Clause

205. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
206. There is some debate among the circuit courts over this issue. The D.C. Circuit held that the
Clause does contain a nondisclosure privilege. Compare Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660 (citing Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1995)), with United States v.
Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1034 (9th Cir. 2011) (expressly disagreeing with the D.C. Circuit regarding
the existence of a nondisclosure privilege), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1097 (2012).
207. See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660; Brown & Williamson, 62 F.3d at 420−21.
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includes a nondisclosure privilege;208 however, it has made clear that it
will read the Clause “broadly to effectuate its purposes” and that the
Clause’s purpose “is to insure that the legislative function the
Constitution allocates to Congress may be performed independently.”209
This language and U.S. Supreme Court precedent suggest that the Court
will undertake a functional analysis.210 Congress could be impeded from
performing its legislative function independently if plaintiffs could, as a
matter of right, compel members of Congress to disclose documentary
evidence stemming from “legislative acts.” As the members of Congress
argued, having to respond to discovery requests from plaintiffs unhappy
with the outcome of the state legislative process could be a major
distraction.211
However, the Renzi court took the position that distraction alone is
not the only consideration when determining whether the privilege
should attach unless the underlying action itself is barred.212 The Renzi
court held that the Clause “does not blindly preclude disclosure and
review by the Executive213 of documentary ‘legislative act’ evidence.”214
Furthermore, in the redistricting context, as noted above, members of
Congress could avoid disclosure through artful pleading that would
place their activity within the “legislative activity” sphere.215 Limiting
disclosure to non-legislative activities could run the risk of barring
redistricting plaintiffs from accessing the information necessary to show
impermissible gerrymandering.216
Separation of powers is one of the bases for the Clause,217 and this
concern is simply not acute in redistricting cases. This kind of case is

208. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660.
209. Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501−02 (1975).
210. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811 (1982).
211. Motion to Prevent Disclosure, supra note 19, at 5.
212. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1035 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1097
(2012). The court cited the following U.S. Supreme Court cases to illustrate this point: United States
v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 480–81, 488 n.7 (1979); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 629 n.18
(1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 173–77 (1966) (describing the government’s
investigation into actual legislation and other clear legislative acts). Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1036−37.
213. Renzi was a criminal case, and so the executive branch was involved. See 651 F.3d at 1018.
However, based on the analysis in Part I.B, there is good reason to believe that Renzi’s reasoning
applies in civil actions as well as criminal.
214. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1037.
215. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
216. Many of the same concerns have analogs in the criminal context. See Harrell, supra note 96,
at 389−90.
217. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1164.
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significantly different from the bribery and corruption cases that have
recently been the subject of Speech or Debate Clause cases.218 In bribery
and corruption cases, the executive branch investigates and potentially
prosecutes legislators.219 That means that the executive branch will
subpoena documents220 or acquire a search warrant.221 Then, members of
the executive branch will review material that may or may not be
legislative in nature.222 That scenario is perilous because of the
separation of powers concerns—one of the Clause’s key rationales.223
However, civil discovery is different. Plaintiffs can make discovery
requests, but they cannot obtain search warrants.224 More importantly,
plaintiffs seeking to show improper redistricting criteria represent a
diminished threat to separation of powers. Private plaintiffs do not form
a coequal branch of government, so there is little risk of encroaching on
legislative independence. Of course, the power of the judiciary may be
brought to bear on members of Congress, but only as a response to
discovery requests initiated by a plaintiff or group of plaintiffs.225 And
yet, even in the criminal context, where separation of powers concerns
are much more pronounced, the Ninth Circuit has refused to “blindly
preclude disclosure.”226 This is because there are legitimate counter
interests to the legislature’s need for independence.227
The Renzi court identified crimes such as corruption and bribery that
the executive branch would prosecute.228 While the bad acts are different
in the civil context, they still present legitimate counter interests to the
legislature preserving independence and avoiding distraction.229 In Perez

218. See, e.g., United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
219. See id.
220. See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 608–10 (1972).
221. See, e.g., Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660.
222. See, e.g., id. at 656−57.
223. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1164.
224. See Overview of the Fourth Amendment, 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3, 4 (2008).
225. For example, in Perez v. Texas, the plaintiffs made a discovery request, the members of
Congress asserted legislative privilege as a basis for nondisclosure, and the court then issued a
memorandum opinion compelling the members of Congress to disclose the requested material. See
Order, supra note 18. Although separation of powers is still a concern when one branch exerts
power against another branch, it is simply not an acute concern in this case because the judiciary
cannot initiate a confrontation unilaterally.
226. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1037 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1097
(2012).
227. See Harrell, supra note 96, at 404−05.
228. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1020.
229. Id.
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v. Texas, for example, the plaintiffs had a legitimate interest in
vindicating their voting rights.230 Proving intent to redistrict based on
impermissible criteria is a difficult task,231 and if plaintiffs were
precluded from this avenue because members of Congress were able to
artfully plead that they were undertaking “legislative activity,” then it
would be nearly impossible for plaintiffs to vindicate their voting
rights.232
Permitting documentary disclosure may not be appropriate for all
forms of congressional activity, but redistricting simply does not
implicate concerns that justify a nondisclosure privilege.233 To the
contrary, the restrictions on impermissible redistricting practices should
be vindicated by a transparent discovery process that allows plaintiffs to
access the information they need to show impermissible
gerrymandering.
B.

Courts Should Apply Discovery Rules and Existing Privileges
Instead of Resorting to a Nondisclosure Privilege

Discovery rules can act as a check on plaintiffs who abuse the power
to compel disclosure in redistricting cases. Although Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 34 does allow for broad disclosure, members of
Congress will still have an opportunity to respond to inappropriate
requests.234 Members of Congress may be concerned that plaintiffs will
bring suit and seek discovery to pry into political strategy or just to
block a redistricting plan based on partisan motives. The latter kind of
suit happens anyway,235 and courts can act as discovery referees to
ensure that plaintiffs are not abusing the discovery system. Courts
should not hesitate to impose Rule 26(g)236 sanctions on plaintiffs who
misuse this broad regime of disclosure.
Moreover, members of Congress will still be protected by the use
privilege237 and by the testimonial privilege of the Speech or Debate
230. See Order, supra note 18.
231. HEBERT ET AL., supra note 137, 63−64.
232. See supra Part II.B.
233. Because separation of powers concerns are diminished in the civil context, and because
pragmatic concerns—such as harassment and distraction—can be dealt with through other, less
drastic means, redistricting does not merit a nondisclosure privilege.
234. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34.
235. Federal Court Involvement in Redistricting Litigation, supra note 129, at 879−80.
236. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g).
237. Green, supra note 7, at 501. A use privilege, in the context of the Speech or Debate Clause,
means that the Executive or other litigant cannot use any evidence that came from a protected
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Clause.238 Even if plaintiffs gain access to documentary evidence
stemming from legitimate “legislative acts,” if they try to use that
evidence in impermissible ways, members may assert legislative
privilege.239 If the documentary evidence does stem from “legislative
acts,” then a court can prevent plaintiffs from using it as evidence, and
can certainly prevent the evidence being used as the basis for liability.240
Members of Congress may be generally concerned that the legislative
process would run the risk of being disrupted.241 Of course, some
plaintiffs will still probably find ways to abuse the system, but the
current reality is that there is serious power asymmetry between
members of Congress and many plaintiffs, especially minority groups.242
Part of that asymmetry is deliberate, but only to the extent that it allows
Congress to operate without fear of coercion from the other two
branches of government243 and without distraction from legitimate
legislative activity.244 This Comment’s proposed solution tries to level
the playing field without sacrificing Congress’s independence or its
ability to function properly.
VI. THE MODERN ARTICULATION OF A “LEGISLATIVE ACT”
SHOULD NOT COVER MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
COMMUNICATING WITH STATE LEGISLATORS
REGARDING REDISTRICTING
The Clause’s underlying rationales and the realities of redistricting do
not support including an absolute nondisclosure privilege, but it is still
important to define the scope of the privilege in the event that others
legislative act against a legislator in court. Id.
238. See United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1035 n.27 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct.
1097 (2012).
239. See Green, supra note 7, at 501.
240. See Harrell, supra note 96, at 404−05.
241. See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“This
compelled disclosure clearly tends to disrupt the legislative process: exchanges between a Member
of Congress and the Member’s staff or among Members of Congress on legislative matters may
legitimately involve frank or embarrassing statements; the possibility of compelled disclosure may
therefore chill the exchange of views with respect to legislative activity. This chill runs counter to
the Clause’s purpose of protecting against disruption of the legislative process.”); MINPECO, S.A.
v. Conticommodity Servs. Inc., 844 F.2d 856, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“A litigant does not have to
name members or their staffs as parties to a suit in order to distract them from their legislative work.
Discovery procedures can prove just as intrusive.”).
242. See HEBERT ET AL., supra note 137, 63−64.
243. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972).
244. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975).
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disagree that the Clause is not one of nondisclosure. For example, the
Texas court resolved the Perez dispute by resorting to the “legislative
acts” test. While it is arguably a dangerous approach for future plaintiffs,
it is nonetheless a predictable one. This section describes how the Perez
v. Texas court applied the test, and argues that such an application could
allow future members of Congress to exploit Speech or Debate Clause
protection.
The key question for the “legislative acts” test is this: to what extent
will members of Congress be protected from disclosing documentary
material? And, more specifically, to what extent—if any—will members
be protected from disclosing documentary material relating to their
involvement in congressional redistricting? For the legislative privilege
to apply, the action “[f]irst . . . must be ‘an integral part of the
deliberative and communicative processes by which Members
participate in committee and House proceedings’ . . . . Second, the
activity must address proposed legislation or some other subject within
Congress’ constitutional jurisdiction.”245 As this Comment explains
below, the activity in Perez v. Texas—based on how the members
invoked the privilege—falls outside of the Speech or Debate Clause.
However, if the members had asserted the privilege in a different
manner, the court might have been bound to find that the members were
acting “legislatively.”
A.

Gravel Narrowed the Privilege’s Scope, but Failed to Provide
Concrete Guidance

When the U.S. Supreme Court articulated the legislative acts test in
Gravel, it signaled a significant narrowing of the scope of the
privilege.246 This definition is adequate for easy cases such as those
involving formal action in official business, including “voting,
conducting hearings, issuing reports, and issuing subpoenas.”247 But it
does not resolve the lingering problems that arise when applying the
privilege to new facts that do not, at first-glance, fall neatly within the
categories of “legislative” or “non-legislative” action.
The drawback to the Gravel test, and U.S. Supreme Court Speech or
Debate Clause precedent generally, is that it does not provide much
245. Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 709 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Gravel, 408
U.S. at 625).
246. See Brewster, Gravel, and Legislative Immunity, supra note 27, at 146; Reinstein &
Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1118; Walker, supra note 28, at 377.
247. Bastien v. Office of Campbell, 390 F.3d 1301, 1314 (10th Cir. 2004).
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concrete guidance for interpreting the scope of the privilege in cases that
are not factually on-point.248 Courts and scholars have tried to delineate
the scope of the Clause by drawing on dicta from U.S. Supreme Court
cases.249 However, since Gravel, the Court has had limited opportunities
to apply the new test.250 While these few cases help to define the scope
of the privilege by accretion, there is still substantial uncertainty. Each
case has an episodic feel, as if there is no well-defined test that courts
can readily apply to new factual scenarios.251
B.

Future Courts May Find Communications Like Those in Texas v.
Perez to Be “Legislative” in Nature

The Perez court tried to draw on precedent to put flesh on the barebones standards used by previous courts dealing with legislative
privilege. It cites to cases involving members of Congress trying to
influence executive agencies,252 and distills a principle from those cases:
specifically, that the members of Congress “[had] discussed a matter
outside of their jurisdiction” and had sought “to influence the decisions
of the state legislative body.”253 This is a clever move by the court, and
the court’s principle does have some appeal. But it is questionable
whether the court’s reading of those cases really extends to the facts of
Perez.
In both Hutchinson v. Proxmire254 and United States v. Johnson,255 the
Court stated in dictum that members of Congress who try to influence
executive agencies would not be shielded by the Speech or Debate
Clause.256 In those instances, the Court presumably would be concerned
with separation of powers issues. But in the Texas redistricting case, the
members of Congress were conferring with the state legislature.257
248. 26A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5675 (1992).
249. Id.
250. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421
U.S. 491 (1975); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501
(1972).
251. 26A WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 248, § 5675.
252. Order, supra note 18, at 5–6 (citing Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 121 n.10, 131; United States v.
Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 (1966)).
253. Id. at 6.
254. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
255. 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
256. See Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 121 n.10, 131; Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172.
257. Order, supra note 18, at 3.
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Unlike in Hutchinson and Johnson, there are no separation of powers
concerns. There may be issues of federalism, but there is no evidence
that the Speech or Debate Clause has roots in federalism similar to its
roots in separation of powers.258 While the court’s argument has some
appeal, it does not seem to square with the origins of the Speech or
Debate Clause.
Regardless of whether these cases were apposite, the Perez court was
correct in finding that what the members of Congress claimed to be
doing was not “legislative.”259 The correspondence with the Texas state
legislators had nothing to do with any part of a house or committee
proceeding, which is the first part of the two-part test fashioned by the
Ninth Circuit. Also, the way the members argued for nondisclosure
seems to fall outside of the second part of the test, which requires the
activity to involve proposed legislation or some other subject within
Congress’s constitutional jurisdiction. Even though Congress has broad
constitutional authority to regulate redistricting, the members did not
argue this point.260 Had they made that argument, the Perez court might
have reached a different result.
C.

By Resorting to Gravel’s Legislative Acts Test, the Perez Court Left
a Means by Which Future Members of Congress May Circumvent
the Test

Redistricting, as has been noted,261 is unique. Congress has a textual
grant of authority to regulate election matters, which extends to
redistricting.262 While that grant does not authorize members of
Congress to try to persuade state legislators to redistrict based on
impermissible criteria, such as racial animosity,263 it does create a sturdy
hold to which members of Congress could link their activity to
legitimate “legislative acts” and so invoke the protection of the Speech
or Debate Clause. The members of Congress did not make that
argument; instead, they seemed to rely on the lack of precedent and the
future distractions that could ensue if the court did allow for
disclosure.264
258. See Reinstein & Silverglate, supra note 28, at 1164.
259. Id. at 5−6.
260. See Motion to Prevent Disclosure, supra note 17.
261. See supra Part II.
262. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
263. See supra Part II.B.
264. See Motion to Prevent Disclosure, supra note 19, at 5. Additionally, the members of
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Now that members of Congress know that the Texas court—and
perhaps future courts—will reject arguments involving a lack of
precedent and potential distraction, they will surely explore other
options. One option mentioned above is to try to link redistricting to an
activity that the U.S. Supreme Court has protected in no uncertain terms.
Congress has a textual grant of authority to regulate redistricting
matters,265 and it is foreseeable that Congress could use that authority to
legislate in the area of redistricting. This means that the next time a
scenario like the one in Texas takes place, members of Congress could
instead explain that they were investigating potential redistricting
legislation.
As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court has squarely held that
investigating potential legislation constitutes “legislative activity” for
purposes of the legislative privilege.266 In fact, the Perez court, in
denying the Congresspersons’ motion, explicitly stated that “[t]his was
not proposed legislation or some other subject within Congress’
constitutional jurisdiction.”267 This adds support to the theory that if the
members of Congress could have tied what they were doing to activity
that the U.S. Supreme Court and the Constitution authorized them to do,
then their correspondence would have been protected.
D.

Even Though the Privilege “Breaks,” Plaintiffs Will Still Struggle
to Obtain These Kinds of Communications Because of the State
Versions of the Federal Speech or Debate Clause

One solution to the potential problem of members of Congress
evading disclosure through using the arguments discussed above is to
obtain the information by forcing the other party to the
communication—in the Perez case, the state legislators—to disclose.
However, as noted earlier, most states have some kind of speech or
debate clause that is more or less the same as the Federal Speech or
Debate Clause.268 And although some states have interpreted their
versions of the Clause more narrowly than have federal courts,269
Congress relied on the previous redistricting cycle when the same plaintiffs had sought discovery
and the court had quashed those subpoenas, as well as the district court’s decision in Cano v. Davis,
211 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 537 U.S. 1100 (2003). Id.
265. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
266. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504−05 (1975) (explaining that the
privilege will attach when Congress investigates in a procedurally regular manner).
267. Order, supra note 18, at 5.
268. Huefner, supra note 30, at 224, 235–37.
269. See id. at 259.
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Professor Huefner has advocated for states to interpret their state
versions to make them coextensive with the Federal Clause.270
If states follow Professor Huefner’s advice, then the privilege would
not actually “break” in practice. Instead, plaintiffs would be unable to
access key information from either state legislators or members of
Congress because both would likely be protected by the Clause. Of
course, that is assuming that the state legislators would also assert the
state privilege. Interestingly, in the Perez case, the Texas state legislators
did not assert their state legislative privilege.271
CONCLUSION
While the seemingly narrow “legislative acts” test may seem to help
plaintiffs, it could have the opposite effect in redistricting cases. If courts
merely dispose of this issue by resorting to the standard “legislative
acts” test, then they will incentivize legislators to give more artful
explanations for why what they are doing constitutes a “legislative act.”
And Congress’s entrenched authority over redistricting matters may
leave future courts with no choice but to prevent disclosure.272
To prevent that outcome, future courts should undertake the following
analysis. First, courts should follow the Ninth Circuit’s approach and
clarify that the Speech or Debate Clause does not contain an absolute
nondisclosure privilege.273 By addressing this as a threshold matter,
courts will obviate the need to use the “legislative acts” test until later.
Second, courts should use the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to filter
out discovery requests not made in good faith. By using these rules,
courts can protect members of Congress from being harassed by overly
burdensome discovery requests. Third, if a litigant tries to use
documentary evidence obtained through discovery, courts should then
conduct the “legislative acts” test to determine whether the evidentiary
privilege that is undoubtedly included within the Speech or Debate
Clause prevents the litigant from using the documentary evidence in
court. While members of Congress may face some increased distraction,
courts should be well-equipped to ensure that plaintiffs are not making

270. See id. at 270.
271. Order, supra note 18, at 5.
272. In spite of Gravel’s narrowing language, the dearth of cases in which the test has been
applied—coupled with their episodic feel—indicates, at best, that things remain uncertain. See
supra Part IV.A.
273. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1034 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1097
(2012).
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such requests only to harass and to delay. Whatever minor distress
members of Congress undergo will be offset by the benefit to
redistricting plaintiffs, and governmental transparency in general.

